



FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL

Task Force Report

MANAGING SECRETARY CLINTON'S STATE DEPARTMENT: AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT

June 2011

Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt
President, Foreign Affairs Council

American Academy of Diplomacy

American Foreign Service Association

Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide

Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training

Association of Black American Ambassadors

Business Council for International Understanding

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Una Chapman Cox Foundation

Nelson B. Delavan Foundation

DACOR

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FOREWORD

This is the Foreign Affairs Council's (FAC) fifth biennial assessment of the stewardship of the Secretary of State as a leader and manager. The FAC is a nonpartisan group of 11 organizations concerned about the resource needs and organizational effectiveness of the platform from which diplomacy and development are conducted. While many individuals and organizations assess the performance of Secretaries of State in their foreign policy role, only the FAC analyzes Secretaries as institutional managers.

These assessments began in 2001 after a decade of budget cuts (about 30%) had left the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the U.S. Foreign Service without the skilled staff and modern equipment necessary to meet the foreign policy challenges of the 21st century. Our objective was to focus Secretaries of State on management issues by publicly highlighting their short-comings as well as achievements in that dimension of their responsibilities. We believe we have made progress in meeting this objective. At the least, past, current and future Secretaries now know that they will be judged by contemporaries and by history on the effectiveness of their management of the nation's foreign affairs institutions.

The present report assesses the first two years of Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton's stewardship. It documents dramatic progress on a variety of managerial fronts. However, it is issued just as federal budget constraints threaten to halt and even reverse a decade of resource and management improvements.

Many of the advances highlighted in this and previous reports will be quickly undone if budget cuts turn back the clock to 2001 when our foreign affairs agencies were starved for resources and our diplomats and development experts were burdened with additional, post-9/11 missions. Among these continuing missions are: promoting peace and stability in regions of vital interest; confronting terrorism, failed states, pandemics and other transnational threats; addressing environmental concerns; managing diplomatic relations with other nations; promoting economic and democratic development; meeting rising passport and visa demand; and furthering other American interests overseas, e.g., helping U.S. business interests and protecting American citizens.

While this report focuses on the stewardship of Secretary Clinton, we are mindful that the ultimate responsibility for funding U.S. international engagement rests with the President and Congress. In the coming months and years, history will record how the President and Congress carry out their Constitutional duties to provide for the civilian components of our common defense.

Thomas D. Boyatt, President, Foreign Affairs Council

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NOT ALL SIGNATORIES AGREE WITH EVERYTHING CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT, ALTHOUGH THEY UNANIMOUSLY CONCUR WITH ALL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

INTRODUCTION

In the private sector it is axiomatic that companies must periodically reinvent themselves to deal with new realities – or perish. Among iconic corporations of the 20th century RCA has disappeared, KODAK and Xerox are struggling to adapt, while IBM has successfully converted itself into a new and thriving enterprise.

Having carefully analyzed Secretaries of State as leaders and managers over the past decade, the FAC has noted an over-arching theme in the managerial performances of the last three Secretaries. We believe that Secretaries Powell, Rice and Clinton have all recognized that the “adapt or disappear” imperative applies to the foreign affairs agencies, and have responded in a variety of positive ways. Secretary Powell established the Reconstruction and Stabilization bureau/function and its attendant Civilian Reserve Corps. Secretary Rice reorganized USAID and called for “transformational” diplomacy. Secretary Clinton emphasized the defense, diplomacy, development triad which she has coupled with publication of the State Department’s first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). These actions and follow-on initiatives should all be seen in the context of reinvention.

The characteristics of the new international environment requiring reinvention of the Foreign Affairs agencies have been usefully described by commentators in the media, the think tanks, and the academy. An illustrative list of those characteristics would include failed states, terrorism as an element of asymmetric warfare, the dark side of globalization (pandemics, international crime et al), the growth of non-state actors, both vicious and benign, and new networking and communications media. We would add another dimension to this daunting list. Historically, war has meant the suspension of diplomacy between the parties to the conflict. A war was declared (or begun), diplomats were exchanged and went home, and the militaries fought it out. After the fighting ended, diplomacy eventually resumed. Today, the United States is conducting wars, engaging in diplomacy and pursuing development all in the same limited geographic space and at the same time in Iraq and Afghanistan. Some version of this new norm of simultaneous war (or major violence) cum diplomacy cum development will likely exist in various locales into the future. The Westphalian/Congress of Vienna framework is not geared to deal with this new reality. Recent Secretaries of State have had to shape and change the foreign affairs agencies to be effective in the new context.

Against the backdrop of institutional reinvention, two fundamental imperatives have absorbed most of the management energies of the last three Secretaries. First, there is the absolute requirement to have enough appropriately trained personnel to achieve mission requirements. Without adequate human resources all else fails. Second, there was a need to settle how the development – reconstruction – stabilization functions should be organized and managed to either support U.S. troops in combat or to prevent

situations from developing that require a kinetic U.S. response. We have assessed Secretary Clinton's performance in these two basic areas over the last two years.¹

1. Our past evaluations examined in considerable detail core State Department management issues, for example, morale, recruitment, acquisition and use of modern technology, and management of operations from public diplomacy to passports, visas and protection of Americans and their property and investments. But the two areas we concentrate on in this report have such overriding importance for the long term that we focus upon them.

RESOURCES FOR STAFFING AND TRAINING

As noted above, the foreign affairs agencies lost roughly 30 percent in human and financial resources during the 1990's while staffing 23 new Embassies created by the collapse of the Soviet and Yugoslav empires. Then in the decade following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development faced an unprecedented expansion in the demands placed upon them. Hundreds and then thousands of additional diplomats and development professionals were needed to staff Iraq and Afghanistan, promote peace and stability in other vital regions, fight against terrorism and other transnational threats, manage diplomatic relations and promote other American interests abroad.

An increase of 1,069 State positions during the tenure of Secretary of State Colin Powell (2001-2005) was more than absorbed by the civilian surges in Iraq and Afghanistan plus substantial increases in consular officers (more intensive scrutiny of visa applications to protect our frontiers) and in security officers (to protect others being deployed). Inaction on staffing during the tenure of Secretary Condoleezza Rice (2005-2009) left the foreign affairs agencies with huge deficits in the human resources needed to do what was asked of them in the post-9/11 international landscape. Secretary Rice did propose a robust budget for FY 2009 asking for about 1,000 new positions for State and 500 for USAID and obtained OMB approval for these increases. However, given that FY 2009 was a "lame duck" period for the Bush administration, it did not appear at the time that the budget request would prosper in the Congress and, in any case, would not be acted upon until well after Rice's departure.

Consequently, toward the end of Secretary Rice's tenure, in October, 2008, the American Academy of Diplomacy supported by the Stimson Center produced a landmark "bottoms-up" analysis of resources needed to accomplish foreign affairs missions. Among its recommendations, the *"Foreign Affairs Budget for the Future"* (FAB) called for 4,735 additional Foreign Service positions over 2008 levels - 3,485 positions at the State Department, 1,250 positions at USAID. These numbers included including a training complement of 15% of core staffing to permit essential professional education and inter-agency developmental assignments.

The FAB report's recommendations were endorsed by eight former Secretaries of State. In a bipartisan statement, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice wrote, in part, "Avoiding one war or defusing one major crisis would save many times [the cost of the staffing] increase. Not providing resources for civilians to carry their share of the load will increase the strains on our already badly overstretched military, which has been asked repeatedly to divert personnel to deal with issues from nation building to agricultural development."

In the fall of 2008, the American Academy of Diplomacy (the Academy) presented the FAB in detail to the Chairs and Ranking Members of the State authorizing and appropriating sub-committees in the House and Senate. The reception was positive. The Academy also briefed the principal international advisors of the Obama and McCain campaigns where the reception for our recommendations was even more positive. Later in the fall the Academy was contacted by an Obama advisor who eventually became one of the leaders of the Obama State Department Transition Team for a briefing on FAB. This individual informed Academy representatives that the views of the Obama team paralleled the recommendations of FAB. The Academy responded that the FAC would support strongly with the Congress any requests for added resources for the foreign affairs agencies. Furthermore, we suggested to our interlocutor that the in-coming Obama administration should support Secretary Rice's robust 2009 budget request on a bi-partisan basis to obtain a strong start on the drive for additional resources. This was done successfully and the FY 2009 appropriations bill added 992 new Foreign Service positions at State and 300 positions at USAID.

In November 2008, Barack Obama won the presidency pledging to reinvigorate U.S. diplomacy and strengthen development assistance. At her swearing in on January 21, 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton pledged to employ a "smart power" strategy that did not rely solely on military means, but also harnessed the tools of diplomacy and development assistance. She later named that approach "Diplomacy 3.0: Diplomacy Development and Defense" and fleshed it out in the landmark December 2010 report "*Leading Through Civilian Power: The First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review*" (QDDR).

In a subsequent Stimson Center 2011 report on "Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service for the United States", "smart power" was embraced as a foundational tenet of management policy, with diplomacy at the vanguard of national security. To buttress such smart power, Secretary Clinton continued past Secretaries' commitments to have a 21st Century Foreign Service that looks like America. Indeed, various Secretaries of State have sought to institutionalize programs to produce a more representative Foreign Service. Such programs inter alia include recruitment, mentoring, internships and the Pickering and Rangel Programs, which bring exceptional minority candidates into the Foreign Service. We applaud the Department for safeguarding these programs under current budget pressures and urge Secretary Clinton to expand these and other programs to accelerate the evolution of the Foreign Service into one that looks like America.

Using 2008 as the base line, Secretary Clinton's strategy seeks a 25 percent increase in Foreign Service staffing at State by FY 2013 (an increase of 2,997 positions) and a doubling of USAID staffing by 2012 (an increase of 1,200 positions) – close to the numbers called for in the 2008 FAB report. Toward that end, soon after taking office the

Administration submitted a FY 2010 budget request that succeeded in adding 764 Foreign Service positions at State and 350 positions at USAID.

The FY 2009 and FY 2010 staffing increases that achieved a 17 percent expansion of the Foreign Service were a remarkable accomplishment for Secretary Clinton, President Obama and Congress. Yet, with most of the new employees being sent out just to fill existing vacant positions, Foreign Service staffing levels still fell far short of that needed to fully restore America's diplomatic and development capacity. In an August 2010 report to Congress, the State Department documented the need for 1,250 additional Foreign Service positions. The unmet needs included additional positions to staff strategic areas including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East; to increase training opportunities in foreign languages and professional education; to expand public diplomacy outreach; and to promote other vital national interests overseas.

To close those gaps, the Administration's FY 2011 budget request (forwarded to Congress in February 2010) sought 410 new Foreign Service positions at State and 200 at USAID. One year later, with the FY 2011 budget still pending before Congress (and opposed by the Republican majority in the House), the Administration submitted its FY 2012 budget request seeking an additional 150 Foreign Service positions at State and 165 at USAID. Thus, as of May 2011, the combined FY 2011 and FY 2012 unmet Foreign Service staffing requests totaled 560 at State and 365 at USAID.

In her letter to Congress accompanying the FY 2012 budget justification, Secretary Clinton included this explanation of the need for additional staffing to build civilian power:

"This budget request contains the funding we need ... to accomplish our mission and advance American security interests. The funding supports diplomats and development experts who are working every day to protect our national security, promote our economic growth, and project our values in virtually every country on Earth... As our partners at the Department of Defense often point out, these investments save money and lives by preventing conflicts and helping end them more quickly. Deploying our diplomats and development experts is less expensive than deploying our troops."

Unfortunately, when Congress belatedly passed the FY 2011 budget in April 2011, it did not include funds to hire additional personnel above attrition. Furthermore, as this FAC report goes to press, Congress appears poised to reject the Administration's FY 2012 request to strengthen staffing at the State Department and USAID. We hope that does not happen. Many observers, including the Secretary of Defense and eight former Secretaries of State, have urged Congress, the Administration, and the American people to broaden their conception of national security as depending not only on military power, but also on strong diplomatic and development corps, to meet the increasingly

complex external challenges of the 21st century. We urge Congress to continue to fund a better balance between the civilian and military components of national power by increasing Foreign Service staffing.

CONCLUSION. Secretary Clinton has energetically and appropriately pressed for the resources necessary to give the United States the civilian tools it needs for conducting foreign relations in the 21st century.

THE QDDR AND DEVELOPMENT, STABILIZATION & RECONSTRUCTION

The FAC's 2009 assessment of Secretary Rice devoted a chapter to her efforts to rationalize the 60-year debate between development practitioners pursuing an independent USAID and "whole of government" proponents advocating development as part of broad diplomatic effort managed by Ambassadors overseas and the Secretary of State in Washington.

A case can be made for both positions in the debate. Development practitioners argue that sustainable development is a process that cannot always fully align with the United States' foreign policy objectives in a particular country. However, the reality is that the last three Secretaries of State have worked for the "whole of government" approach. It is now hard to visualize a future Secretary of State ceding responsibility for development to others. Additional factors bending the discussion in favor of the "whole of government" view are:

- Ambassadorial authorities. By statute (P.L. 96-465, "The Foreign Service Act of 1980,") and by Presidential directive Chiefs of Mission have "full responsibility for the direction, coordination and supervision of all Government employees in [the country of assignment]," authorities that clearly include the USAID missions at post.
- The Mission Strategic Resource Plan (MSRP). Annually, every Ambassador, with the participation of all elements of the Country Team including most importantly USAID, produces a MSRP. This is the first step in the policy recommendation/resource allocation process, and is accomplished on a "whole of government" basis.
- The Budget Process. MSRP's are consolidated and regional priorities established at the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance at State and the Office of Budget and Resource Management at USAID with input from relevant bureaus. The regional plans go up through the bureaucratic process to the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and are signed by the

Secretary. The Budget proposal for the 150 Account (International Affairs) then goes to the Office of Management and Budget at the White House where it is consolidated with other agencies and submitted to Congress on a “whole of government” basis.

- The Congressional Process. The Secretary of State defends the bulk of the Administration’s submission of Chapter 150 of the National Budget before to both Houses of Congress. The appropriations committees dispose of the budget request in whole of government terms albeit with significant earmarks.
- Current Political Realities. Today’s fiscal restraints on the national budget that are real and the ascendancy of the Republican Party, at least in the House, have changed the political environment significantly. USAID would be even more vulnerable to program reductions than it already is without the protection of the office of the Secretary of State and the personal influence of Secretary Clinton.

Since her arrival at the State Department, Secretary Clinton has repeatedly emphasized the national security triad of “diplomacy, development and defense.” She also made it clear on arrival that it was time to end the debate about the bureaucratic process of development and to concentrate on making development happen. Her position on this matter was not unchallenged as the tortuous process of writing and agreeing the content of the QDDR placed in stark relief.

In July 2009, Secretary Clinton announced that the State Department and USAID would produce an inaugural Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). The goals were: to elaborate a strategic management plan with a practical and relevant time horizon; to elicit clear, hard decisions about priorities; and to ensure that these priorities were reflected in the budget’s allocation of resources. In short, the goal was to answer the question: *How can we do better?* Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew and the Administrator of USAID, Rajiv Shah, co-chaired the effort. Given Deputy Secretary Lew’s other commitments, the Director of State Policy Planning, Ann-Marie Slaughter, played a major role.

The QDDR was announced in mid-2009 and targeted for publication by the end of 2009. The release date was then serially postponed throughout 2010 and the QDDR was finally published at the end of 2010. The “back story” for the delays is widely believed to be the re-opening of the usual and probably inevitable debate between the “whole of government” proponents (the Secretary’s advisors) and some development practitioners (including some USAID personnel) and various supporters. And why not? Major questions on development broadly defined were on the table: missions, structure, lines of authority, personnel systems, and the like. The QDDR did what it

was supposed to do. It surfaced the tough issues, and decisions were made and are now being promulgated. In early 2011, there was a lull in QDDR implementation. However, the Director General of the Foreign Service reports that since early April, 19 separate committees in State and USAID have been working on QDDR implementation.

Before looking at QDDR results we want to make a fundamental point. Secretary Clinton made clear that she wants USAID to be the “preeminent global development institution.” From an historical perspective FAC would argue that USAID and its predecessors are already the world’s preeminent development institution. Whether the name was the Marshall Plan, the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the Alliance for Progress (the Alliance), or the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the American governmental development effort has been generally successful. Europe was rebuilt in the 1940’s and 50’s, major economic development was promoted in Latin America in the 1960’s and 1970’s, and significant contributions were made to the rise of the “Asian Tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia). U.S. development efforts also played a positive role in the conversion of the nations of Eastern Europe into successful free-market democracies, and development efforts in Africa and the Middle East were sustained to the point where today success stories are beginning to emerge even in those very difficult areas. The Congress should factor USAID’s long history of success into current decisions about funding development.

The most important of the QDDR decisions follow.

1. In her cover letter to the QDDR, Secretary Clinton states that the reforms of the QDDR begin with the “chiefs of mission in our embassies around the world.” “We will give our chiefs of mission the tools they need to oversee the work of all U.S. Government agencies working in their host country, essentially serving as the chief executive officer of a multi-agency mission. We will enhance their training, empower them to contribute to the evaluation of all personnel who serve at their posts, and engage them more fully in policymaking in Washington.” The FAC strongly supports this initiative and the QDDR reforms discussed below. We will work to assist the Secretary in achieving them particularly where legislation is required.
2. The U.S. Government will focus its efforts in six development areas where we are best placed to deliver results: food security, global health, global climate change, sustainable economic growth, democracy and governance, and humanitarian assistance. USAID is immediately vested with responsibility for food security programs and will be vested to lead global health initiatives pending meeting certain requirements at the end of FY 2012. Apparently the President’s Emergency Program for Aids Relief (PEPFAR) will remain with the State Department, although the rationale for the continued special status of PEPFAR

along with the delayed decision on management of the Global Health Initiative is unclear. USAID will share responsibility for the Global Climate Change Initiative with State and Treasury. USAID will play a major role in economic development aligning itself with the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) that pursues programs only in countries that meet minimum standards of open markets, rule of law, participatory democracy and suppression of corruption. Elsewhere in the QDDR (see below) USAID is given responsibility for humanitarian assistance.

3. Secretary Clinton commits in the QDDR to building USAID as the premier development agency. The threshold requirement, of course, is adequate personnel resources for USAID. Regarding quantity, 550 of the 1,200 necessary additional personnel have been brought on board. As to quality, the intention is to include more experts in evaluation, planning, resource management, contracting and others on staff, significantly reducing dependency on contractors for internal management and oversight. In addition, USAID has established a new Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning to reintroduce research, knowledge-sharing and evaluation. Further enhancing USAID's position, the Secretary will seek Senate confirmation of the USAID Administrator as the Alternate U.S. Governor to the Asian, African and Inter-American Development Banks.
4. USAID has initiated 5-year Country Development Coordination Strategies (CDCSs) in 25 countries and will expand these to all missions by FY 2013. Also, a new Office of Budget and Resource Management has been created to develop USAID's annual budget proposal and oversee budget execution. How this will fit with overall planning is discussed below.
5. Development budget procedures are clarified by the QDDR with the designation of the F Bureau as the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources reporting to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary for Management. This office will integrate all foreign assistance budget proposals, including those in Embassy Mission Strategic Plans as aggregated by State's Geographic Bureaus, and those in USAID's CDCSs as aggregated by USAID. The overall budget proposal will then be presented to the Deputy Secretary for Management and the Secretary. The Director of Foreign Assistance will also approve uses of appropriated funds and any significant changes in allocation during the fiscal year. The ultimate goal is to ensure that diplomatic and development activities are mutually reinforcing.
6. The QDDR establishes prevention and response to crises, conflicts and instability as a core mission of the State Department. This mission also includes stabilization and reconstruction as active combat draws to a close (as in Iraq as this assessment is written). The QDDR emphasizes that "The State Department

will lead operations in response to political and security crises and conflicts” and “USAID will lead operations in response to humanitarian crises.” To carry out State’s responsibilities the QDDR calls for the creation of an Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. The current Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) will become the core bureau under the new Under- Secretary and will coordinate early prevention efforts and any necessary rapid deployments of civilian responders. The current bureaus of International Narcotics; Population, Refugees and Migration; Democracy, Rights and Labor; and other offices will be united under the new Under Secretary’s aegis. USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) will be expanded. Whether OTI will be shifted to the new Under Secretary for Civilian Security Democracy and Human Rights will be revisited.

7. The existing Civilian Response Corps consists of an active segment of 250 immediately deployable officers and a stand-by reserve of up to 2,000 active and retired federal employees trained in various aspects of nation-building and deployable on reasonably short notice. A Civilian Reserve of private citizens was authorized but never funded by the Congress. The QDDR now proposes to seek Congressional approval to replace the “Civilian Reserve” with a new Expert Corps. The Expert Corps will consist of an active roster of technical experts (including some of the temporary hires who successfully served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere) who are willing, but not obligated, to deploy to critical zones. Continuing improvements based on lessons learned will be made in the surge capacity.
8. Finally, in addition to the changes and clarifications in mission assignments, organizational structure and process noted above, the QDDR also will result in other management improvements, including inter alia, the following:
 - Providing enhanced training for State, Foreign Service and USAID personnel with emphasis on management skills including planning and budgeting, resource management, multi-agency operations and “whole of government” solutions. Joint training of diplomatic and development officers will be pursued where feasible.
 - Ensuring that personnel levels include positions dedicated to training (the “training float”) so that training and staffing needs do not conflict.
 - Supporting cross-training at State and USAID so that personnel in these agencies speak each others’ language, understand each others’ work, and collaborate effectively in the field.

- Providing additional opportunities for State and USAID personnel to take assignments in the other organization at all levels including the assignment of AID officers as Ambassadors and State Officers as USAID Mission Directors.
- Increasing rotational assignments to other agencies for State and USAID officers.
- Activating the Congressionally authorized State-USAID-Department of Defense Advisory Panel to improve coordination among the three and review roles and responsibilities.
- Taking a variety of steps to improve contracting.
- Establishing an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget to separate such activities from the regular base budget so that extraordinary, one-off activities do not severely damage regular base budgets. This reform has been achieved with the Administration's 2012 budget submission that includes a line-item (\$8.7 billion for State and USAID OCO activities) in DOD's larger OCO budget.
- Completing the process begun in 2007 of consolidating State and USAID administrative support at overseas posts under the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) platform. The consolidation process should give due consideration to incorporating USAID administrative best practices.

CONCLUSION. The FAC believes that this first QDDR and its reforms and recommendations together represent the most significant management initiatives in the operation of the Department of State and USAID in many decades. First, the QDDR as an institutional management tool brings an integrated strategic view for judging the resources necessary for managing the civilian side of America's challenges abroad. Second, it recognizes that many of those challenges must be addressed in multi-year time frames. Third, it enables the Department to deal more effectively with the reality that it's most critical resource is its people, and people take time to acquire and develop. It takes years to accumulate the professional skills, specialized knowledge and personal relationships that are the keys to success in diplomacy and development. We cannot compensate either quickly or easily for the kinds of staff losses incurred in the 1990's.

At this point, of course, the reforms and recommendations of the QDDR are in the stage of declaration ("we will do this") or exhortation ("that should happen"), in short still in a state of becoming. Some, perhaps most, of the improvements can be implemented immediately by the Secretary. Others will require Congressional authorization and additional appropriations. Either way, the Secretary and her team will be required to

demonstrate the strong leadership and stamina that has characterized Secretary Clinton's leadership thus far. This leadership and her concern for the institution and its people have won their respect and buttressed their morale.

As stated in the report itself, "Ultimately, however, the reforms and recommendations presented in the QDDR are only as good as their implementation."

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ACTION

Resources for Staffing and Training

1. Secretary Clinton should pursue her budget proposal to strengthen diplomacy and development assistance by securing funding for an additional 1,250 Foreign Service positions at the State Department and 650 at USAID by FY 2014.
2. To achieve the above recommendation the Secretary should make completion of Development 3.0 the first priority. Small reductions in the various assistance program accounts would fund the personnel increases now pending without damaging the development effort.
3. The Secretary should use a portion of the new positions to complete the staffing of a Foreign Service training complement equal to 15 percent of core staffing in order to provide the professional education and training needed to raise the overall level of performance of the State Department and USAID.

The QDDR and Development, Stabilization & Reconstruction

1. The Department should pursue its request that the Congress pass legislation requiring a QDDR. The process is much too valuable to be left to administrative discretion.
2. The Secretary should vigorously implement the reforms and recommendations of the first QDDR that do not require legislation, and with equal vigor pursue any additional authorizations and appropriations that are necessary to proceed.
3. The Secretary should designate a single senior official to be responsible for implementation of the QDDR.

Appendix: About the Foreign Affairs Council

The Foreign Affairs Council is a nonpartisan umbrella group of 11 organizations concerned about U.S. diplomatic readiness (<http://www.facouncil.org/>). Its mailing address is 2101 E Street NW, Washington DC 20037. FAC member organizations are:

- Ambassador Thomas D. Boyatt, FAC Founder and President.
- American Academy of Diplomacy: a private, nonprofit, nonpartisan, elected society of men and women who have held positions of major responsibility in the formulation and implementation of American diplomacy (www.academyofdiplomacy.org).
- American Foreign Service Association: the professional association and union of the career Foreign Service. Founded in 1924, AFSA has 15,000 members (www.afsa.org).
- Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide: a nonprofit organization that has been an independent advocate for Foreign Service spouses, employees and retirees since 1960 (www.aafsw.org).
- Association of Black American Ambassadors: an organization of current and former African-American ambassadors, career and non-career, working to enhance public understanding of foreign affairs, to strengthen the Foreign Service through improved diversity, and to document African-American achievements in diplomacy.
- Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training: a private, nonprofit organization founded in 1986 to advance understanding of American diplomacy and to support training of foreign affairs personnel at the Foreign Service Institute (www.adst.org).
- Business Council for International Understanding: founded in 1959 to support U.S. business interests internationally by convening member company executives with senior diplomatic and Cabinet-level officials and foreign heads of state (www.bciu.org).
- Council of American Ambassadors: composed of former and incumbent non-career ambassadors, the Council aims to support the role of the ambassador and the embassy country team in carrying out U.S. foreign policy (www.americanambassadors.org).
- Una Chapman Cox Foundation: dedicated to a strong, professional Foreign Service, its activities seek to enhance State's recruitment, professionalism, retention and constituency (www.uccoxfoundation.org).
- Nelson B. Delavan Foundation: a family foundation that supports initiatives to improve the Foreign Service of the United States and the effectiveness of American diplomacy.

-- DACOR: an organization of foreign affairs professionals founded in 1952. It fosters interest in foreign affairs, broadens understanding of contemporary foreign affairs issues, and draws together persons with a variety of backgrounds who share an abiding interest in foreign relations, national security and professional service abroad for the United States. (www.dacorbacon.org).

-- Public Members Association of the Foreign Service, USA: a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization composed of members who have served as public members on Foreign Service promotion boards or inspection teams, or on delegations or commissions.



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FAC ♦ 2101 E Street NW ♦ Washington, DC 20037